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I.—THE GREEK VERBAL IN -TEO.

PART II.—ON THE USE OF THE PLURAL FOR THE SINGULAR IN VERBALIA IN -TEO.

Forerunners to the construction of the plural for the singular are met with in Sanskrit; cf. Delbrück, *Syntaktische Forschungen*, V, p. 83: "Etwas häufiger kommt es vor, dass mit dem neutr. plur. ein singularisches Verbum verbunden wird"; but he considers only three Rig-Veda cases as sure. Similarly in vol. IV of the *Synt. Forsch.*, p. 26: "Es kommen im Rigveda einige Stellen vor, an denen klarlich das Verbum im s. neben dem Neutrum im pl. steht . . . Da nun das Sanskrit sonst die äussere Congruenz mit einer ausserordentlichen Strenge wahrte, so kann diese gelegentliche Abweichung von³ der Congruenz nur als Alterthümlichkeit aufgefasst werden, welche sich gegenüber dem sonst vorhandenen Bestreben, die Congruenz vollständig durchzuführen, nur noch in wenigen Exemplaren gerettet hat," and Madvig (*Griech. Syntax*, p. 3, Anm. 4) teaches that "ein sächliches Adjectiv, mit dem Verbum ἐστὶ von einem Infinitiv ausgesagt, steht (*besonders bei den alten Schriftstellern*) bisweilen in der Mehrzahl." Brugmann (*Gr. Gram.*², p. 198, §173), after rapidly sketching the leading uses of the plural, closes with the words: "Zu allen diesen Gebrauchsarten des Plur. stellen die anderen idg. Sprachen Analogien . . . und es wird wenigens speziell griech. Neuerung sein"; but Delbrück is less bold (*Vgl. Syntax*, p. 147) about the use of sg. and pl. in our family, and uses the words: "Das freilich muss man zugestehen, dass unser

Material selten ausreicht, um mit einiger Sicherheit sagen zu können, wie der Zustand in der Ursprache gewesen sein mag." Approaching the Greek usage of this construction, we first cite a few grammarians. Aristotle, *Rhetor.* III 6: *εἰς ὅγον δὲ τῆς λέξεως συμβάλλεται . . . τὸ ἐν πολλὰ ποιεῖν, ὅπερ οἱ ποιηταὶ ποιοῦσιν*, followed by several examples. Longinus, *περὶ ὕψους*, 23: *ἔσθ' ὅπου προσπίπτει τὰ πληθυντικά μεγαλορρημονέστερα, καὶ αὐτῷ δοξοκοποῦντα τῷ ὅχλῳ τοῦ ἀριθμοῦ*. cf. Dionys. Hal., *De iis quae Thucyd. propria sunt*, §9. Eustathius (p. 759, 38), commenting on the verse (*Il.* I 401) *οὐ γὰρ ἐμοὶ ψυχῆς ἀντάξιον οὐδ' ὅσα φασίν*, says: *ιστέον δὲ ὅτι τὸ ἀντάξιον ἀντὶ πληθυντικοῦ λεχθέν (!) Ἀττικῶς ἐσχημάτισται, καθὰ καὶ ἕτερα πολλὰ . . . καὶ μὴν ἄλλως ἀττικίζεται καὶ τὸ τὰ ἐνικά πληθύνειν, οἷον, οὕτως ἀμυντέα ἐστὶ τοῖς κοσμουμένοις, καὶ οὐ γυναικῶν ἡσσητέα, ἀντὶ τοῦ ἀμυντέον καὶ ἡσσητέον, καὶ, συνεκποτέ' ἐστὶ σοι καὶ τὴν τρύγα, ἢ γουν συνεκποτέον*. *Ibid.* 1657, 44, on *ἀμφὶ δὲ τόξα* (*Od.* κ 262): *τουτέστι τόξον ὃ πολλοῦ πληθύνει Ὅμηρος, ὥς πον καὶ τὰ ἄρματα καὶ τὰ πρόσωπα. χαίρουσι δὲ Ἀττικοὶ τῷ τοιοῦτῳ σχήματι, παρ' οἷς καὶ ἀφύαι μὲν πληθυντικῶς τὸ ἰχθύδιον, etc.* *Ibid.*, p. 114, 36, commenting on *Il.* A 338: *τὸ δὲ, μάρτυροι ἔστων, ἀρχαϊκῶς ἀττικίζεται, κατὰ ἔθος συντάσσον οὐ μόνον διυκὰ ὀνόματα πληθυντικοῖς ῥήμασιν ἀλλὰ καὶ πληθυντικά ἐνικοῖς καὶ ἀνάπαλιν*. *Ibid.*, p. 191, 21, on *Il.* B 135: *τὸ δὲ δοῦρα σέσηπεν, Ἀττικόν. Ἀθηναῖοι γὰρ πληθυντικοῖς οὐδετέροις ἐνικά ἐπάγουσι ῥήματα*. *Ibid.*, p. 38, 41, on *Il.* A 45: *ὅτι ἔθος Ὀμήρῳ ἐν πολλοῖς πληθύνειν τὰ ἐνικά, ὥς ὅτε τὸ ἄρμα λέγει ἄρματα καὶ τὸ τοῦ Αἴαντος πρόσωπον πρόσωπα· οὕτω καὶ τὸ τοῦ Ἀπόλλωνος τόξον τόξα ἐνταῦθα φησὶ διὰ σεμνότητα, εἰπὼν τόξ' ὁμοισιν ἔχων*. *Ibid.*, p. 59, 27, commenting on *Il.* A 107: *καὶ ἔστι τὰ φίλα Ἀττικῶς ἀντὶ ἐνικοῦ τοῦ φίλου, ὥς καὶ παρὰ Σοφοκλεί' οὕτως ἀμυντέα ἐστὶ τοῖς κοσμουμένοις, ἀντὶ τοῦ ἀμυντέον· καὶ, σχέτλια γὰρ ἐμέ γε τάδε πάσχειν, ἀντὶ τοῦ σχέτλιόν ἐστι· καὶ παρ' Ἡροδότῳ νομιζόμενα ἀντὶ τοῦ νομιζόμενον· καὶ παρὰ τῷ κωμικῷ συνεκποτέα ἐστὶ σοι καὶ τὴν τρύγα*. *Ibid.*, p. 1302, 15 (on *Il.* ψ 297): *ὅρα . . . ὅτι ἀντὶ τοῦ δῶρον δῶρα εἶπε, πληθύνας τὸ ἐνικὸν συνήθως, ἵνα ἐνδείξηται τὸ τοῦ δῶρου τίμιον· τοῦτο δὲ καὶ ἄλλως ἀπλοϊκῶς ποτὲ γίνεται, ἥγουν τὸ πληθύναι τὸ ἐνικόν, ὥς μετ' ὀλίγα ἔχει τὸ, δῶμεν ἀέθλιον δεύτερα. τὸ γὰρ σύνθετος ἦν εἰπεῖν ἀέθλιον δεύτερον. τοιοῦτον δὲ τι καὶ τὸ, ἵνα μὴ σε παρεκπροφύγησιν ἄεθλα, ἥγουν ἄεθλον. ἐν γὰρ πάντως ἄθλον ἐνὶ δίδοται*. Similar passages in Eustathius are pp. 557, 29; 47, 27; 1480, 49; 1308, 20; 1679, 58. Schol. Aristoph., *Acharn.* 394. Now, it is no news that Eustathius makes mistakes sometimes; but one point he emphasizes, in common with other grammarians and scholiasts, etc., living at different periods, from Aristotle down to the Middle Ages, viz. that this use of pl. for sg., besides being archaic, dignified,

(pseudo-)majestic like the "ausgepolsterte Schauspieler" of the comedy, is also especially *Attic*; and yet Eustathius himself adduces an example from Herodotus! Already in the Homeric time the construction was handled with some caution, and Nägelsbach (*Anmerkungen zur Ilios*), commenting on the well-known verse A 107, reminds us "dass in allen homerischen Stellen, in denen ein Neutrum Plurale wirklich für den Singular steht, *nicht*, wie hier, die Möglichkeit gegeben ist, den Plural des Neutr. auf den Plural eines Substantivs zu beziehen"—a remark, moreover, which is also true of all other examples in the classical period, so far as the adj. verb. in *-téos* are concerned, since Soph., *El.* 340 and Plato, *Rep.* 387 B are only apparent exceptions to that rule. The construction was evidently used with this circumspectness for perspicuity's sake. The whole state of the case in Homer is thus summed up by Delbrück (*Synt. Forsch.* IV, p. 26): "Es giebt eine Anzahl von pl., in welchen der Gedanke der Vereinigtheit, andere in denen der Gedanke der Mehrerleiheit überwiegt, bei den ersteren steht das Verbum im s., bei den anderen im pl. Zwischen beiden existirt ein Mittelgebiet, bei dem keine der beiden Auffassungen als allein geboten erscheint, bei dem also beide Constructionen möglich sind, ohne dass eine wahrnehmbare Sinnesdifferenz hervortrete. Auf die Wahl der einen oder anderen Construction mag das Metrum nicht ohne Einfluss gewesen sein"; cf. *Monro, Hom. Gram.*², §172. While the above and like statements are rather interesting than satisfactory, and apply to the use of nouns and adjectives, etc., in general, yet they are not without their especial and appropriate interest for our investigation. Similarly two programs should be mentioned here, entitled: 'Ueber den Gebrauch des Plurals für den Singular bei Sophocles und Euripides,' by Prof. Kummerer, of the Klagenfurt-Gymnasium, for the years 1869 and 1870. Curiously enough, the whole of Prof. Kummerer's investigations centre on the pl. of *nouns* only, and hence we can only occasionally draw from him help of material value. The results summed up on p. 6 of the first Heft, summarizing the salient points of the use of pl. for sg. in concrete nouns, would help but little, even were they expressed in more definite words than he there uses. More valuable for us, because more closely connected with our especial theme, is his discussion of the use of pl. for sg. in the case of abstracta. "Im Allgemeinen," says he, p. 1 of the 1870 Heft, "ist zu constatiren die Vorliebe der Tragiker für die Bildung von Abstracten, und

von diesen wiederum das Vorherrschen des Plurals. Es zeigt sich mithin ein Anlehnen und Zurückgehen auf Homer, bei dem das Abstract, als allgemeiner Begriff im Entstehen begriffen, überwiegend im Plural sich findet. Fragt es sich nun, wie der Plural der Abstracta zu erklären sei, so lassen sich die meisten Fälle desselben zusammenstellen mit dem substantivirten Neutrum Plural der Adjectiva und Participia, mit dem er im Gebrauche die grösste Aehnlichkeit zeigt," and he compares the frequent interchange between, e. g., *τύχαι, συμφοραί, πάθη, παθήματα*, etc., with *κακά*. He continues: "Wie das Neutrum Plurale der substantivirten Adjectiva und Participia bezeichnet also der Plural der Abstracta eine Mehrheit. Gleichwie aber beim Neutrum Plural besonders der Adjectiva die Vorstellung einzelner Dinge oft ziemlich verwischt ist und man beim Plural eine Mannigfaltigkeit zu einer Masse geeinigt denkt, ebenso finden sich von Abstracten auffallende Fälle des Plurals, in denen wir diesen grösstentheils nur mit dem Singular übersetzen können." And finally, pp. 13-14, l. 1.: "Werfen wir nun einen Blick auf die Fälle, in denen der Plural von Abstracten auffallend gebraucht erscheint und seine Erklärung Schwierigkeiten verursacht . . . so finden wir den Plural durchwegs *konkret* gebraucht, so dass diese Fälle auch hierin Aehnlichkeit mit dem substantivirten Neutrum der Adjectiva u. Participia zeigen, das ebenfalls mehr oder minder concrete Bedeutung erhält . . . An einen intensiven Gebrauch des Plurals ist mithin schlechthin nicht zu denken." This last remark applies to the neuter adjective: we shall see that the remark would need some change in its casting, when applied to the verbalia in *-τέα*.

Now, adjectives can be used in the neut. pl. expressing 'cases of the manifestation' of the quality in question, or even the abstract quality itself. Similarly participles, though less frequently. Continuing the application of this usage, why not apply it to the infinitive also? Hurriedly sketching the development of this most interesting verb-noun, we note that there is in Sanskrit no infinitive proper in the older language. Whitney (Sk. Gr., §§538 and 969) mentions certain nomina abstracta and nomina actionis, especial cases of which were evidently used much as infinitives are in other languages, and the Greek infinitive *seems* to arise from the dative of some of these nouns. "The distinction between infinitives and other abstract substantives, and again between participles and other primitive adjectives, was probably not always so clearly drawn as it is in Greek. The

infinitives of the oldest Skt. hardly formed a distinct group of words" (Monro, *Hom. Gram.*², §230); "they are abstract nouns of various formation, used in several different cases, and would hardly have been classed apart from other case-forms if they had not been recognised as the precursors of the later, more developed infinitive"; and Delbrück (*Synt. Forsch.* IV, p. 122) develops the infinitive out of the dative of the abstract noun, "welche sich von den Dativen anderer Substantive nur dadurch unterscheiden, dass sie verbale Construction haben können, u. dass neben ihnen selten andere Casus von demselben Stamme gebildet werden"; and we may postulate entire absence of the infinitive, as of all (other) abstract nouns, in the mother-language. But here is the rub: granted that one abstract noun, of verb-idea, can be used in the plural, why not another? Monro (*Hom. Gram.*, l. l.) attempts to see a distinction between the infinitive and (other) verbal nouns, thus: *πάρρειν* and *πῶξαι* suggest a *particular* doing, momentary or progressive, at or during a time fixed by the context; *πῶξις*, on the contrary, denotes a mere *doing*, irrespective of time. But—and Monro half admits it—this cleverly devised distinction easily breaks down in practice, especially in the case of those writers who, like Thucydides, constantly use the verbal noun for the infinitive! Now, so long as the etymological dativeness (?) of the infinitive form continued to be recognized and felt, the speaker naturally resisted the inclination to pluralize *this* abstract noun, as he did others. But when once the origin of the form was forgotten—and that was soon enough, as is shown by the different cases assumed by the infinitive in the earlier language—why not use it in the plural also? If *τὸ πῶξαι* = *πῶξις*, why not *τὰ πῶξαι* = *πῶξις*? There seems to be no satisfactory reason why the substantive infinitive can not be used in the plural, just as any other abstract noun, and as a matter of fact the construction does exist in M.H.D., and Delbrück (*Vgl. Synt.*, p. 169) cites an example from the *Parzival*, *zwei bliuwen*. Surely no language of the I.G. group stands above the Greek in flexibility and capability of adjusting the language to the countless requisites and shadings of human thought; and is it not just possible that in the mass of non-articular noun-infinitives in Greek some, like other *singularia tantum*, may have been logical plurals, others—a smaller number—really felt to be plurals by the ancients?

The use of the plural of verbal adjectives in -τος is at least as old as the *Odyssey*, where *φυκτά* is a substantive (θ 299) in the

line δ τ' οὐκέτι φυκτὰ πέλοντο. This use of the verbals in -τος can be most readily developed out of the *modal* sense of that verbal, since both plurality and modality have this in common, viz. that they do not rivet the action in question down to one positive, avowed and exclusive fact, but leave a certain liberty in both the mood and number of the action-thought. Now, as all -τέος verbalia are modals, we expect to find a richer use of pl. for sg. in -τέος than in -τος verbalia. With verbalia in -τέος, as with other adjectives, the use of the plural is actually more frequent in the earlier period (cf. Madvig, Synt. der griech. Spch., p. 3, §1, b, Anm. 4). Now, as seen above, the ancients (e. g. Gregorius Corinthus, De dial. Attic., §63) regarded this construction as especially Attic (πληθυντικὰ Ἀττικά, Eustathius), and yet even the ancients cited examples from Herodotus, and we are also taught by repeated utterances that the construction is especially poetic: "Imo haec pluralis usurpationis poetis peculiaris est" (Henr. Stephanus, App. de dial. Att., cap. VIII, Thesaurus ling. graec. VIII, pp. 186 ff.). The facts are, more accurately, as follows: The verbal adjective in -τέος occurs generally in the singular; its use in the pl. is comparatively rare. Out of 91 cases of the verbal in -τέος being used personally, about 29 are in the pl. (some cases are of doubtful interpretation). 19 of these 29 are associated with things, giving therefore a preference for the association of the vbl. in pl. with things, not persons. Once it occurs in the gen. absolute in the pl. (Isoc. XV 59).

Following are the passages in full in which the construction under discussion occurs:

Sophocles:

Ant. 677-8: ἀμυντέ' ἐστὶ τοῖς κοσμουμένοις, κοῦτι γυναικὸς οὐδαμῶς ἡσσητέα. Evidently the Schol. (τὰ τῶν νόμων) misunderstood the passus.

O. C. 1426: ἡμῖν δ' οὐχὶ συγχωρητέα.

El. 340: τῶν κρατούντων ἐστὶ πάντ' ἀκουστέα: v. l. ἀκουστέον.

These are the only sure cases in Soph. Gross (III, p. 4) is plainly in error when he refers to this usage, Phil. 116, where τὰ τόξα is the grammatical as well as logical subject, and it is extraneous to the whole drift of the context to introduce this rarer construction. Few things could be more perverse and unnatural than, with Blaydes (cf. note to Soph., Ant. 678), to see some irregularity in the vbl. in ὅποια δραστέ' ἐστίν. This construction is

foreign to the language of Aischylos and Euripides—unless we would follow Blaydes again, who would add to this list Eur., *Androm.* 63: ἄ σοι φυλακτέα!

Aristophanes (the construction is here almost as frequent as in *Thucydides*):

Acharn. 394: καί μοι βαδιστέ' ἐστὶν ὡς Εὐριπίδην. *Schol.*: βαδιστέα ἀντὶ τοῦ βαδιστέον, etc.

Acharn. 480: ἄνευ σκάνδικος ἐμπορευτέα.

Nubes 727: οὐ μαλθακιστέ', ἀλλὰ περικαλυπτέα.

Lys. 122: ἀφεκτέ' ἐστὶ.

Lys. 124: ἀφεκτέα τοίνυν ἡμῖν ἐστὶ τοῦ πέους.

Lys. 450: οὐ γυναικῶν οὐδέ ποθ' ἔσθ' ἡττητέα ἡμῖν.

Lys. 411: ἐμοὶ . . . ἐς Σαλαμίνα πλευστέα.

Ran. 1180: οὐ γάρ μοῦστίην ἀλλ' ἀκουστέα τῶν, etc.

Plout. 1085: συνεκποτέ' ἐστί σοι καὶ τὴν τρύγα.

Herodotus:

III 61: ὡς Σμέρδιος τοῦ Κύρου ἀκουστέα εἶη.

VII 185: τὸ . . . στράτευμα ἔτι προσλογιστέα.

IX 58: ἐκείνοισι ταῦτα ποιεῦσι οὐκ ἐπιτρεπτέα ἐστί.

Gross (III, p. 5) errs in giving *Herodotus* only two such cases, Abicht (ad VII 2, 12) in stating "auch die Adjectiva Verbalia auf -τέος stehen so häufig im Plural." But surely Abicht (cf. note to *Herod.* VII 8, 4) does not mean that in ποιητέα μὲν νυν ταῦτά ἐστι οὕτως the pl. is used for the sg. in the sense in which we use the term here.

Thucydides:

I 86: οὓς οὐ παραδοτέα . . . οὐδὲ . . . διακριτέα . . . ἀλλὰ τιμωρητέα κ. τ. λ.

I 118: ἀλλ' ἐπιχειρητέα ἐδόκει εἶναι.

VI 50: αὐτοῖς πολεμητέα ἦν.

I 72: ἔδοξεν αὐτοῖς παριτητέα . . . εἶναι.

I 79: πολεμητέα εἶναι ἐν τάχει.

I 88: ἐψηφίσαντο . . . πολεμητέα εἶναι.

I 93: ὡς ἀνθεκτέα ἐστί (sc. τῆς θαλάσσης).

II 3: ἐδόκει οὖν ἐπιχειρητέα εἶναι.

VI 25: τρήρεσι . . . πλευστέα.

VII 60: τοῖς δὲ Ἀθηναίοις . . . βουλευτέα ἐδόκει.

As is known from the statements of countless grammars, this construction is one in which *Thucydides* delights most.

Some of the statements concerning the frequency of this usage are little short of amusing. Gross (III, p. 4) says, philosophically: "Apud Thucydidem paullo inferior est numerus pluralis, quam singularis gerundii." To prove how utterly unreliable such a statement is we need but note the fact that Thucydides uses the verbal in $\tau\epsilon\omicron$ demonstrably impersonally 20 times, pl. for sg. 12 times; besides these cases there come the vexatious class of neuter forms which are dubia, and it is a sheer impossibility in the great majority of such instances to even approximate a certainty as to whether the Greeks felt them to be personalia, agreeing, or impersonalia, governing. This use of the verbal in pl. for sg. does not occur in Xenophon—who, by the way, uses the verbal in $\tau\epsilon\omicron$ in the *Anabasis* 23 times, not 20 times, as Joost teaches us, 'Was ergibt sich aus dem Sprachgebrauch Xenophons?', etc., p. 30. The loci are: *I* 3, 15; *II* 4, 6; *III* 1, 18; *III* 1, 35; *III* 3, 8; *IV* 7, 3; *V* 6, 5; *VI* 4, 12; *VI* 5, 12; *VI* 5, 12 from ω trans. verbs; *III* 2, 23; *IV* 4, 14 from ω intrans. verbs; *III* 1, 7; *V* 3, 1; *VI* 5, 30 from $\mu\iota$ intrans. verbs; *I* 3, 11; *IV* 6, 10 from $\mu\alpha\iota$ trans. verbs; *II* 2, 12; *II* 5, 18; *II* 6, 8; *IV* 1, 2; *IV* 5, 1; *VI* 6, 14 from ω verbs in middle sense. Passages like *Mem.* I 1, 6; *Anab.* V 6, 6; *III* 1, 35; *Oeconom.* XIII 3 are to be explained as personalia.

Plato is said by Moisisstzig (*II*, p. 5) never to have used this plural for the singular; Gross (*III*, p. 5), however, cites five passages which he thus interprets, while Kopetsch (pp. 28–9), conceding that Gross is right in one, possibly two passages, argues that the others are misinterpreted by Gross. The construction is certainly rare in *Plato*; yet the following instances seem plain:

Republic 532 D: οὐ γὰρ ἐν τῷ νῦν παρόντι μόνον ἀκουστέα. Kopetsch's argument against our interpretation is far from convincing: "ἀκουστέα refertur ad verba plura: itaque neutrum pluralis suo iuro est positum"; in which event we must correct *Plato* for continuing "ἀλλὰ καὶ αἰθεὶς πολλάκις ἐπανιτέον" in the very same construction!

Leges 895 A: κάλλιστα εἶπες, συγχωρητέα τε τοῖτοis. Both Gross and Kopetsch seem to have overlooked this passage.

Leges 770 B: ἀλλ' οὖν πειρατέα γε καὶ προθυμητέα.

Republic 387 B: ταῦτα ὀνόματα πάντα . . . ἀποβλητέα, κωκυτούς τε καὶ στίγας, etc.

Republic 387 C: ἀφαιρετέα ἄρα, in same construction as above, ἀποβλητέα.

Epistolae 341 D: εἰ δέ μοι ἐφαίνετο γραπτέα θ' ἱκανῶς εἶναι πρὸς τοὺς ἄλλους. It is plain that this conditional is not grammatically connected with the γεγραμμένα of the preceding clause: it is vague—sweeping—in its meaning: “if writing must be done.”

The *Attic Orators* never admit this construction (cf. e. g. Schulze, p. 5), unless in loci like Antiphon, B δ 2; Andocides, I 136; Dem. XXXVI 30; Aischines, I 138; Dinarch, II 1, we should be as “perverse and unnatural” as Blaydes was (above) in his note on Soph., Ant. 678.

We note a few more minute particulars concerning the grammatical setting of the verbal in -τέα for sg. The agent of the verbal is expressed 8 times, omitted 28 times—which more frequent omission of the agent-specification adds to the vague, more sweeping tone of the command or suggestion clothed in the verbal in -τέα. Moreover, the comparatively few cases of this expression of the agent are confined to the earlier period: of the 8 cases, 1 occurs in Aischylos, 6 in Aristophanes—for clearness' sake, in the sermo plebeius and dialogue?—1 in Thucydides. This expressed agent-case, always the dative, shows a preference for the position before the verbal, which position it occupies 5 times, as against 3 times after it; nor does there appear to be any connection between the pluralness of the verbal and the grammatical number of its agent—of the 8 agent-datives, (ἐ)μοί occurs 3 times, σοι once; ἡμῖν 3 times, αὐτοῖς once! While therefore half of the agent-cases are sg., half pl., the pronoun of the 1st person occurs 6 times, as against one case of the 2d person, one of the 3d person. Of the direct objects of these pl. verbalia, 4 are accusatives, 7 genitives, 3 datives; there are, moreover, 3 prepositional phrases, while in the remaining 19 cases the vbl. is used absolutely. The copula is expressed 18 times, omitted 18 times! This would be all the more surprising, since *in the whole mass of verbalia in classical Greek, from Theognis to Deinarchus inclusive, the copula is hardly expressed so often as once in four cases.* Furthermore, the expressed copula regularly follows its vbl. (so 15 times, while preceding it only 3 times—once in Soph., twice in Aristoph.); is oftenest in the indicative (= 11 times), infinitive 6 times (of which 5 are in Thucyd., 1 in Plato), optative once (in

Herodotus). There is especial strength and significance in the association of these pl. verbalia with the copula always (for so it is) in the sg. Had the copula been in the plural, the vbl. might have been differentiated—broken up into the numerous cases which, combined, constitute the general statement of the verb's action contained in the pl. vbl.; when, however, the plural of the verbal is connected with the sg. of the copula, the resultant is the might of unity plus the sweeping exhaustiveness of the pl. These verbalia generally occur in affirmative sentences (= 27 cases), less commonly in negative (= 9 cases). Now it is not to be denied that a certain sweeping force is given the statement by this use of the plural, however difficult, not to say impracticable, it is to define the limits—as has been attempted—between specific, specific-general and universal command. This sense of a sweeping, more comprehensive and therefore less detailed suggestion or request is present in, e. g., Antig. 677–8; El. 340; Lys. 450; Herod. III 61 (and IX 58?); Thucyd. VI 50; I 79; I 88; Plato, Rep. 387 B; this (characteristic) force of the combination is less prominent in the comedy—where the action is more narrowed down to the limits of the individual theme to be developed—and this *ὅγκος τῆς λέξεως* is sometimes further increased by the presence of the sweeping negative or a word like *πάντα* or the like. We can readily understand Thucydides' love for this stately plural: that Aristophanes' characters are also no little taken with it is not strange, since no class is more delighted with aping stateliness and terrible authoritativeness than the half-lettered.

This pl. for sg. occurs in both transitive and intransitive verbs, but Madvig is unfortunate in citing *ιτηρέα* (Syntax, p. 86, §84, *δ*), since this (uncompounded) form is not found in classical Greek.

Proceeding to the dubia, we first note those verbalia which are accompanied by the 'complementary' *infinitive*.¹ We might know at least how the construction of those verbals should have been explained originally, if we knew what case the inf. represents; but even its etymological case is almost as far from being practically settled now as it was before Bopp, Meyer, Curtius et al. showed us that this crystallized noun-form being, as it were, disguised, its prehistoric development is conjectural. Granted

¹ As in the remainder of this thesis we shall be discussing larger groups of words, clauses, etc., the fragments of the Orators and Historians and Philosophers will be almost entirely ignored from this point on.

that we incline to the identification of the Greek ending *αι* with the Sanskrit *ê* of *vêdanê*, itself a locative, yet the unstable and deceptive functions of these dative-locative infinitives are too well known to readers of the Journal (cf. A. J. P., vol. XIV, p. 373); and I claim that it is very possible that different usages of the infinitive may have sprung from cases which were in origin etymologically quite different.

We can do little more here than catalogue examples. The commonest verbals are *πειρατέον* and *ἐατέον*. Of these I count something like 3 cases of *πειρατέον* in Xen., 29 in Plato, 5 in Isoc.; of *ἐατέον*, 1 in Eurip., 1 in Hdt., 10 in Plato, 1 in Isocrates. While therefore the infinitive depending on *ἐατέον* or *πειρατέον* has as much right to rise to the position of a nominative as any other neuter can, yet as the passive of *ἐάω* is more regularly used personally, it almost amounts to a certainty that such verbalia are transitive-active, not personal-passive. The remaining cases of the non-articular infinitive dependency will detain us but a short time. *ἀναγκαστέον* and *προθυμητέον* occur each 7 times with the infinitive, (*ἀπ*)*οκνητέον* and *τολμητέον* similarly 6 times each, *ἐπιχειρητέον* 4 times; *ἐθιστέον* 3 times; *ἐγχειρητέον*, *ἐπιτρεπτέον*, (*παρα*)*σκευαστέον* and *ποιητέον* each twice; the rest (*διακελευστέον*, *διακωλυτέον*, *εὐλαβητέον*, *προτιμητέον*, *ἀνεκτέον*, *ἀρκτέον*, *αἰτητέον*, *μηχανητέον* and *προστακτέον*) each once, according to my statistics. Many of these infinitives are, considered from the standpoint of logic, datives. But, e. g., *προστάσσω* can (in Thuc. and Herod.) be used in the *passive* and inf.! The interpretation of Xen., Mem. II 1, 28 is disputed, but we construe *ὑπηρετεῖν* as inf. of result (or purpose?) after *ἐθιστέον*, while *σῶμα* is obj. We interpret the infinitive after *προθυμητέον* (cf. Pl., Cratylus 421 D, etc.) as loc. acc. limiting the sphere of the leading verb. Is *ἀκούειν* (in Pl., Laws 638 E) a genitive? It seems that the acc. of the active is not often turned into the nom. with the passive of *διακελεύω*, hence the greater probability that the vbl. is neuter in Pl., Laws 631 D. Politicus 262 C *ἐπιχειρητέον* has the inf. The verb is generally followed by the dat., sometimes by the acc.; the dative is as early as Theognis 75. Is not the inf. after *ἐθιστέον* (Pl., Repub. 396 A) a final dative? After the analogy of *εὐλαβοῦ τὸν κύνα*, we construe the inf. *μεταβάλλειν* (Pl., Rep. 424 C) as an accus. We have an especial pocket for cases like Pl., Rep. 378 E: *περὶ παντὸς ποιητέον* . . . *ἀκούειν*, where the *ἀκούειν* is, as it were, an accus., *περὶ παντός* being the other in the construction of the double accus. Similarly Lycurgus 15, etc.

Before leaving the subject of the non-articular-infinitive dependency, we hurriedly note the O. O. dependencies, depending on ῥητέον, etc. Some theory of the much-debated construction of the acc.+inf. must be accepted, and we hesitatingly follow, e. g., Schmitt (Ueber den Ursprung des Substantivsatzes mit Relativpartikeln im Griechischen), and consider the infinitive as representing the original locative, fixing the *sphere within which* the leading assertion obtains. If that theory be accepted, all such verbalia are impersonal. It is useless to cite example after example; the verbalia dicendi, etc., are ἡγήτέον, νομιστέον, ὁμολογήτέον, ῥητέον, μαντευτέον, ξυγχωρητέον, φατέον, λεκτέον, θετέον, πιστευτέον, ὑπολογιστέον, διαμαχετέον. Examples teem on all sides.

The articular-infinitive dependencies follow. Peculiarly enough, all the examples, with the exception of Dem. XXIII 101; Xen., Mem. IV 2, 30, and II 1, 2, occur in Plato. Now, some of these infinitives may be nominatives; the majority certainly seem to be accusatives, and but little help can we draw from those statisticians who teach us that the articular infinitive occurs somewhat more frequently in nom. than in acc. in Plato; while in Schanz's Beiträge, Heft VII, p. 75, under the subject of the articular inf. in Plato, Birklein uses this language: "Wir zählten in den echten Dialogen 745, in den unechten 187 solche Infinitive, zu denen das grösste Contingent der Infinitive als Subjekt stellt." Further on (p. 81, l. l.) he states that the articular inf. occurs most frequently, in proportion, in the Gorgias, next comes the Phaedo, then Cratylus and Theaetetus; least frequently in the Kritias, Lysis, and Timaeus. I have counted 13 verbalia on which articular infinitives depend; as said above, all of these, except three, are in Plato. Περὶ πολλοῦ (πλείστον) ποιητέον occurs three times—Xen., Mem. IV 2, 30; Plato, Crito 48 B; Dem. XXIII 101—and everything points to the impersonal interpretation as the true one. The infinitives depending on εὐλαβητέον and μελετητέον—and ἐπιχειρητέον—(Gorg. 527 B; Philebus 59 E, etc.) are inner accusatives, unless final causative; and the personal use of these verbs in the passive is not common enough to imperil the correctness of this interpretation of the infinitives. The inf. after διακινδυνευτέον (Timaeus 72 D) is terminal, whether (logically) a dat. or an accus.; but the reading in the passage is questioned. Two compounds of αἰρέω, ἐξαίρετέον (Theaetet. 157 B) and ἀφαιρετέον (Repub. 361 B) close the list. Looked at from the standpoint of the theoretical logician, scarcely one of these infinitives could be considered

certainly a nominative; moreover, the probability is that to the average speaker they were all, more or less, considered as accusatives, and hence the reigning verbal was used impersonally.

ὅτι dependencies come next. The progressive development of the pronoun ὅτι into its function as a conjunction is hidden from us, hence are hidden what hints its earlier usage might have afforded us as to its case, and the case of the whole ὅτι clause. Both in form and meaning its Skt. predecessor *-yad-* had also been crystallized, though its antecedent still showed different cases: *tad, tātas, tātra, tēna, tāsmād, tyā, tyād, etād*. If the antecedent is in, e. g., a dative, we naturally expect the ὅτι (or *yad*) clause to be a dative; but that the *caseness* of the appositive clause was lost sight of is established, or betrayed, by the fact that the particle introducing that clause did not vary in form, in order to conform to the varying case-form of its antecedent. But the etymological kinship seems to be dismissed by Schömann (Lehre von den Redetheilen, S. 178 and 180), who finds in ὅτι, whether causal or circumspective, an accusative of the inner object; while Curtius (Greek Grammar Explained, p. 218) and Capelle (Beiträge zur Hom.-Syntax, 191 ff.) go yet further, and refer ὅτε also to this accusative origin. If comparative philology does not prove the case of the word ὅτι, common usage has for all that pretty generally stamped ὅτι clauses as accusatives, though not infrequently doing violence to the logical relationship between dependent and leading clause. In my lists I have eleven verbalia thus connected with ὅτι clauses, all of which occur in Plato! Verbs of saying and remembering are somewhat conspicuous: λεκτέον (Sophistes 259 A, 248 C), μνημονευτέον (Rep. 441 D), ῥητέον (Timaeus 89 E), ἐννοητέον (Leges 636 C), λεκτέον (Epinomis 989 B). The genitive after μνημονεύω may be replaced by the accusative of the "Inhalt der Vorstellung"; and if ἐννοέω is neuter when accompanied by the participle (cf. Krüger, §56, 7, 4), it is probably neuter and hence impersonal when followed by a ὅτι clause.

Like ὅτι, ὥς is a relative, by origin; moreover, it is an ablative (cf. Thomas, De particulae ὥς, etc., p. 6; Schmitt in Schanz's Beiträge, Heft VIII, pp. 51 ff.; Delbrück and Curtius, a. a. o.). Again, it is only in Plato that we find the few cases of a ὥς clause depending upon the verbal, and such clauses are always indirect quotations—never indirect questions, as Schmitt (l. l., p. 52) warmly contends. Of course, the verbals are generally those of

'saying,' etc.: ῥητέον (Rep. 550 D), κατηγορητέον (Theaet. 167 A), διανοητέον (Laws 729 E), λεκτέον (Rep. 378 B, 380 B), ἀποκριτέον (Protag. 351 C), λεκτέον (Philebus 57 A). In Euripides, Iph. Aul. 468 we interpret the ὡς in the final sense. To be noticed is the sudden shift from the personal to the impersonal sequence in Philebus 57 A.

Something of an oddity is the passage in Plato, Theaet. 160 C, in which the irregular participle occurs where we expected an infinitive. Krüger says this is rare, often preceded by ἀγγέλλω: it occurs more frequently in the tragedians than in Homer. The passage seems impersonal. So Politicus 304 D.

Ὅπως clauses follow. Like ὡς, ὅπως is an ablative in form, and it is related to ὡς as ὅστις to ὅς. What was said above as to the case-nature of ὡς, and hence, by inference, of ὡς clauses, is true of ὅπως: in usage ὅπως clauses naturally depend the more frequently on verbs of effort, striving, etc. I have noted one case of such a ὅπως dependency in Aeschylus, 14 cases in Xenophon, 6 (only) in Plato, 6 in Isocrates, 1 in Aeschines. The more frequently recurring verbals are βουλευτέον (Aesch., Ag. 847; Xen., Cyrop. IV, V 24), σκεπτέον (Xen., Anab. I, III 11; IV, VI 10; Cyrop. V, II 23; Isoc. VI 71; XII 164), ἐπιμελητέον (Xen., Cyrop. VII, V 70; Oecon. VII 36; VII 36; VII 37; Hipparchicus, I 3; I 3; De re equestri, II 3; Plato, Rep. 618 C), φυλακτέον (Xen., Oecon. VII 36; Plato, Timaeus 90 A; Isocrates, V 35). Others are προνοητέον (Xen., Oecon. VII 36), παρασκευαστέον (Pl., Gorgias 480 E; Xen., Hipparch. I 7), εἰτέον (Plat., Rep. 421 C), μηχανητέον (Pl., Gorgias 481 A), προστακτέον (Plat., Rep. 527 C), περὶ παντὸς ποιητέον (Isoc. IV 174), πρακτέον (Isoc. XII 164), πειρατέον (Isoc. XIV 4), φροντιστέον (Aeschin., Ep. XI 13). The logical case-relation becomes confused when (e. g. Xen., Anab. I, III 11) the ind. quest. at the same time expresses the aim of the action of the leading verb; so again when such a ὅπως clause is preceded and announced by a τοῦτο (Xen., Anab. IV, VI 10); again, we expect a genitive expression after ἐπιμελέομαι, and hence also after ἐπιμελητέον. Is not the ὅπως clause necessarily telic-dative, resp. causal, after the neuter verbal (e. g. μηχανητέον), or is it the accusative of the effect? But the verbal in Gorgias 480 E is necessarily an impersonal, its agent being expressed in the accusative (πράττοντα, etc.). Somewhat analogous to the antecedent τοῦτο is the announcing οὕτως of Isocrates, XIV 4; and we are reminded of the note of Breitenbach-Büchschütz on Xen., Cyrop. I 2,

5: "Nach ἐπιμελεσθαι und ähnlichen Verben bedeutet ὅπως und ὡς eigentlich *wie*."

For want of a better place, I append here the anacoluthon-disturbed passage, Xen., Mem. II 1, 28: τὰς πολεμικὰς τέχνας αὐτὰς τε παρὰ τῶν ἐπισταμένων μαθητέον καὶ ὅπως αὐταῖς δεῖ χρῆσθαι ἀσκητέον; cf. Kühner, ad loc.: "τε steht nach αὐτὰς, indem der Schriftsteller im Sinne hatte zu schreiben: τὰς πολεμικὰς τέχνας αὐτὰς τε καὶ ὅπως αὐταῖς δεῖ χρῆσθαι μαθητέον: . . . dann aber fügt er zu den Worten καὶ ὅπως αὐταῖς δεῖ χρῆσθαι ein neues Prädikat (ἀσκητέον) hinzu. Die Worte ὅπως αὐταῖς δεῖ χρῆσθαι muss man gleichsam wie ein Substantiv auffassen: τὴν χρῆσιν αὐτῶν ἀσκητέον ἐστίν."

Indirect questions introduced by εἰ arise in two ways: "Einerseits von dem Gebrauch der Konjunktion in Sätzen, die sich an Verba des *Versuchens* anschlossen . . . Andererseits von Bedingungssätzen aus, die sich an Verba des *Sagens* anschlossen" (Brugmann, Gr. Gr., p. 233). Then the objectivity of these clauses is evident: the clause gives the limits, the 'in-respect-to-which,' of the leading action, and εἰ itself appears to be a locative (Vaniček, Etm. Wörterb. II, p. 1034; Curtius, G. Gr. Exp., p. 219, etc.). I have not a single case, in which such a clause depends on a verb in the 3d sg. *passive*, to which it could be construed as a nominative. Plato uses the verbal in this construction in 9 cases, and always the word is σκεπτέον (Theaetet. 145 A, 204 B; Charmides 158 D; Philebus 36 E (bis); Repub. 352 D (bis); Theaetet. 163 A; Sophist. 260 B). Only an apparent exception is Rep. 389 A: οὔτε . . . ἂν τις ποιῇ, ἀποδεκτέον, where the εἰ means 'if, when.' Remarkably enough, we have only 4 instances of the construction outside of Plato: Isocrates 6, 102: ἐπιδεικτέον ἐστίν, εἴ τι, etc.; Dem. XX 10: εἰ μὴ . . . ἀπόλλυτε, μόνον σκεπτέον; XXII 45: σκεπτέον, εἰ . . . τιμᾶσθε, etc.; Isaeus, IV 14: σκεπτέον δὴ ὑμῖν . . . εἰ ἐποίησατο, etc. As illustrating the transition from εἰ = 'whether' clauses to ind. quest. we cite Eurip., Helena 268: ὅστις (= εἰ τις) . . . κακῶνται, βαρὺ μὲν, οἰστέον δ' ὅμως.

Here would follow also other instances of the indirect question. Now, the case-relationship of these dependent-apposition clauses is very difficult of deciding. In his 'Grammatische Kleinigkeiten' (Güstrow, 1871, p. 13 ff.) Raspe discusses several cases of 'Satz-apposition.' In the majority of those cases he finds the appositive to be in the accusative case, even though its leading sentence be independent ('unabhängig'); cf. also Dräger, Tacitus³, Einleitung u. Uebersicht, §47. Why the accusative in Ἐλένη

κτάνωμεν, Μενέλεφ λύπην πικράν? Surely not because in all such cases the accus. apposition is thereby closely connected with some preceding accusative; the nom., on the other hand, with a subject, etc. Many cases can be adduced in which such a distinction—superficial enough, at best—can not be proved to obtain. When in such an instance the accusative occurs, it is used as the case expressive of emotional contemplation; the nominative in such cases is the subject of an (unexpressed) verb, and hence the latter clause contains much more assertion than was the case with the accusative. Moreover, in the instance cited, the emotional nature of the leading verb—κτάνωμεν—is in sympathy with the suggested explanation of the accusative, λύπην.

But to return to the matter of the indirect question. Goodwin (M. and T.², §668) asserts that "As an indirect question is generally the object *or* subject of its leading verb, it may stand in apposition with a pronoun like τοῦτο which represents such an object or subject . . . τοῦτο δῆλόν ἐστιν, ὅτι σοφός ἐστιν," etc. And yet in his list of passages there is barely a single instance which must necessarily be construed as a nominative. Nor is the accusative explanation of the dependent or appositive clause excluded, finally, even in the cases in which there is a preceding τοῦτο; for the neuter can, in a sense, never rise to the full dignity of being a true subject; and, granted even that it grammatically does so do, there is yet always possible that shifting of the view-point by which the grammatical appositive sinks into an object of emotional contemplation. The bulk of the facts in hand all point to the objective as the most probably real case-nature of the dependent clause; hence the verbal would be impersonal. It is not necessary to detail the examples in question. Out of the 51 instances which I have noted, σκεπτέον occurs most frequently—20 cases in all (Xen., Sympos. VIII 39, bis; Plat., Gorg. 508 B; Theaet. 181 B; Parmenides 160 B, bis; 157 B, bis; Repub. 394 C, 421 B, 558 C; Menon 86 E; Leges 649 C, 652 A; Euthyphron 9 E, bis; 15 C; Sisypchos 389 B; Isocrates, II 9; V 35); λεκτέον occurs about half as often as σκεπτέον (Plat., Theaet. 164 C; Parmenides 160 D; Timaeus 30 C; Leges 934 C, 767 C; Phaedrus 253 D, 266 D, 262 E; Politicus 269 C). The remaining loci are Soph., El. 16 (βουλευτέον); Eurip., Herc. Fur. 1221 (ἀνοιστέον); Xen., De re equestr. II 1 (γραπτέον); Mem. II, VI 1 (ζητητέον); Agesilaus, VIII 3 (παραλειπτέον); Sympos. VIII 39 (ἀθρητέον . . . ἐρευνητέον); Plato, Gorgias 202 E (ιστέον); Repub. 413 C (ζητητέον), 379 A

(ἀποδοτέον); Menon 96 D (ζητήτεον); Timaeus 90 E (ἐπιμνηστέον), 65 C (ἐμφανιστέον); Leges 719 E (ρήτεον), 874 D (διοριστέον), 885 B (ρήτεον); Epinomis 980 A (ρήτεον); Cratylus 415 A (ζητητέα); Sympos. 217 C (ιστέον); Sophistes 244 B (πευστέον); Crito 48 A (φροντιστέον); Isocrates 12, 59 (δηλωτέον). Here again we note the rarity of these sentence-dependencies outside of Plato. Wishing-clauses, with μή, were originally exclamatory accusatives, parallel to the noun-accusative, expressing the object of emotional contemplation. Such clauses, then, appear as depending on verbs of fear, caution, etc. (cf. Delbrück, Synt. Forsch. I, p. 23). The following cases are therefore impersonalia: Plato, Repub. 416 B: φυλακτέον . . . μή . . . ποιήσωσι . . .; φυλακτέον; Demosth. 16, 5: σκεπτέον . . . μή . . . ἐάσωμεν.

We approach the close of these somewhat tiresome lists, when considering very briefly cases like τοῦργον ἔστ' ἐργαστέον, τοῦτο κρυπτέον, τί δραστήον; οἰστέον κακόν, etc., when all common-sense feelings as to the exact case of the troublesome neut. τοῦτο, etc., might be expected to yield to the imperious dictates of logic and what should be, rather than what is. "Der Nominativ," says Delbrück, Synt. Forsch. IV, p. 78, "bezeichnet im Indogermanischen nicht das Subjekt der Handlung im logischen Sinne, sondern denjenigen, der für den Betrachtenden als Träger und Mittelpunkt des durch das Verbum ausgedrückten Vorganges erscheint." Logically, such a τοῦτο, etc., is objective, though grammatically an apparent nominative; and, as a matter of fact, the circumstance that the majority of the verbals in -τεο are demonstrably impersonalia, leads us to suspect that to be the proper interpretation of such cases as these. And they are numerous enough, extending all the way from the very first recorded verbal—Theog. 689—down to the bitter end of the period now under consideration. I have counted 292 examples, which will be herewith dismissed. That such expressions were not ambiguous enough to be considered inelegant is proved by the fairly abundant use of them in Demosthenes and other orators.

Herodotus uses not infrequently what appears to be the article instead of the relative pronoun; e. g. I 191: ἔμαθε τὸ ποιητέον οἱ ἦν = "quid faciendum esset"; VIII 40: βουλευσονται τὸ ποιητέον . . . ἔσται; IX 60: δέδεκται . . . τὸ ποιητέον. But in the following cases we have the genuine article associated with the verbal: Thucyd. IV 99: γιγνώσκειν τὸ ποιητέον; Xen., Cyrop. VIII 5, 5: διατέτακται . . . τὰ ποιητέα; Oeconom. XII 14: παρῇ τὸ πρακτέον,

the first instance of this construction occurring in the nominative case; Rep. Lac. XIII 5: παραγγέλλει τὰ ποιητέα: Dem. VI 28: περὶ . . . τῶν ὑμῶν πρακτέων: Eurip., fg. 377: εἶδέναι τὸ δραστήον. The situation and its genesis is thus stated in Struve's Opuscula (II, p. 215): "Bestimmt aber behaupte ich, dass diese Verbalia nie epithetisch Adjective gewesen sind, dass man also nicht sagen kann οἱ ἐπαινετέοι ἄνδρες, τῶν ἐπαινετέων ἀνδρῶν u. s. w. Auch nicht substantivisch, οἱ ἐπαινετέοι u. s. w. Nur eine Ausnahme statuire ich hier, deren Ursprung den Philosophen, wie ich glaube den Stoikern, zugeschrieben werden muss. Diese haben namentlich für ganz bestimmte philosophische Begriffe diese Verbalia als Epitheta, ursprünglich im Neutrum, gebraucht, wie τὰ ποιητέα, τὰ πρακτέα, τὰ φευκτέα, und vielleicht einige andere; und die sind dann auch in die Schriftsprache als reine Adjectiva epitheta übergegangen." But Struve does not substantiate his statements by citing the passages; nor, indeed, can some of them be upheld by examples from the classic literature of our period. Moreover, the 'philosophic' origin of the τὸ ποιητέον construction is rendered more than very doubtful by the fact that not one instance of that construction (acc. to my statistics) occurs in Plato, and in the Fragmenta philosophorum graecorum I have no certain example to adduce. The normal position and use of the verbal is predicative, and predicative only.

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